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Abstract
We show that mutual funds compete for climate-conscious investment flows. In 
April 2018, Morningstar introduced a climate-focused label for mutual funds. The 
release of the “Low Carbon Designation” induced reactions on both the demand 
and supply sides of the market. First, investors flocked to funds receiving this 
eco-label. Second, active funds that missed the label at its initial release respond-
ed to the new incentive by shifting their holdings towards more climate-friendly 
firms. In sum, climate-related information can trigger competition by financial 
intermediaries along their climate performance. However, the resulting portfolio 
shifts may also expose investors to higher idiosyncratic risks.
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Abstract
We show that mutual funds compete for climate-conscious investment flows. In April
2018, Morningstar introduced a climate-focused label for mutual funds. The release
of the “Low Carbon Designation” induced reactions on both the demand and supply
sides of the market. First, investors flocked to funds receiving this eco-label. Second,
active funds that missed the label at its initial release responded to the new incentive
by shifting their holdings towards more climate-friendly firms. In sum, climate-related
information can trigger competition by financial intermediaries along their climate
performance. However, the resulting portfolio shifts may also expose investors to higher
idiosyncratic risks.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the key economic challenges of our time. Economists and public
policy scholars increasingly agree on the merits of carbon taxes and/or tradable permits
to ensure adequate pricing of carbon emissions at the international level.1 However, given
the current practical and political challenges in implementing such policies, policy-makers
are also exploring alternative strategies that can accelerate the transition to a low-carbon
economy. One central approach is to make “financial flows consistent with a pathway towards
low greenhouse gas emissions” (Paris Agreement, Article 2) by improving the climate-related
information available to investors about their portfolios.2
The success of this strategy, however, relies on the twin assumptions that investors will
respond to more transparency by demanding more climate-conscious products and that fund
managers and other intermediaries will in turn shift their assets towards more climate-
friendly holdings. In this paper, we investigate whether these assumptions hold. We do so
by studying mutual fund and investor behavior.
Mutual funds play a crucial role in the overall economy. As of year-end 2018, US and
European mutual funds, respectively, had some USD 17.7 trillion and USD 11 trillion in assets
under management (Investment Company Institute, 2019). On April 30, 2018, Morningstar,
the most important information provider in the mutual fund industry, introduced an eco-label
for mutual funds, the Low Carbon Designation (LCD).3 This event altered the information
1See Nordhaus (2019). On the internalization of external costs in general see the fundamental contribu-
tions of Pigou (1920), Coase (1960), and Weitzman (1974).
2For instance, as a follow-up to the “Action plan for sustainable finance” of March 2018 (European
Commission, 2018), regulators are currently developing the criteria for an EU-wide eco-label for financial
products that should help retail investors “express their investment preferences on sustainable activities.”
3Many studies (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2019, Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008, and Hartzmark and Sussman,
2019) document the strong influence of Morningstar’s ratings and classifications on investor behavior.
1
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available to investors on the climate performance of mutual funds.
Using this quasi-experimental setting, we establish three key results: First, funds that
are awarded the LCD enjoy substantially higher monthly flows than conventional funds.
Second, active mutual funds that missed the label at its initial release shifted their holdings
towards more climate-friendly firms. That is, funds began to compete for flows also through
their climate performance. Third, funds labeled as low-carbon by Morningstar have higher
idiosyncratic volatility than conventional funds, due to their lower sectoral diversification.
To develop these results, we first show in Section 4 that investors reward funds recognized
as “climate-friendly”. Funds that were labeled as low-carbon at the end of April 2018 on
average enjoyed a 24 basis points increase in their monthly net flows relative to conventional
(not-low-carbon) funds. This is a sizable economic impact, corresponding to about half of
the effect of a one-standard deviation stronger financial performance in the prior month.
These findings hold controlling for many other factors, including the generic fund perfor-
mance (“Stars”) and sustainability ratings (“Globes”) of Morningstar for which prior work
had shown an impact on fund flows (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008, Ammann et al., 2018,
Hartzmark and Sussman, 2019). A battery of robustness checks alleviate concerns that the
findings are driven by other unobserved factors.
Why do investors prefer low-carbon funds? We find a stronger boost of flows for retail (vs.
institutional) funds, poor (vs. good) financial performers, and low (vs. high) sustainability
funds. Moreover, the effect of LCD on fund flows remains virtually unchanged even when
we account for future fund performance in the regressions. Together, these findings suggest
that non-pecuniary preferences, rather than expectations for higher returns, play a major
role in the demand for low-carbon mutual funds.
2
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Next, Section 5 studies how active mutual funds reacted to the revealed investor prefer-
ences and to the implicit incentives created by the LCD. While Ammann et al. (2018) and
Hartzmark and Sussman (2019) document a flow effect due to Morningstar’s Globes ratings,
they do not study the supply-side reactions of fund managers. Our setting is uniquely suited
to deliver an analysis of fund responses because the LCD is based on absolute criteria (not
on a relative ranking, as is the case for the Globes). The ability of a fund manager to reach
the LCD, therefore, does not depend on the portfolio choices of her peers.
We find that after the label’s introduction and through the third quarter of 2019, active
funds that did not receive the label at its first release rebalanced their portfolios towards
more climate-conscious firms. For example, during the six quarters the LCD was in place,
non-recipients reduced their portfolio Fossil Fuel Involvement (the portfolio’s exposure to
fossil-fuel-related firms) by 1.75 percentage points relative to LCD-recipients. This effect
becomes substantially larger when we account for changes in the underlying relative asset
valuations of fossil-fuel intensive sectors.
We interpret the observed behavior of fund managers as a supply-side reaction to the
surge in demand for climate-responsible investment products, supported and accelerated in
the mutual fund industry by the release of the LCD. To reinforce our analysis, we show that
the reaction of fund managers is particularly strong when they have the flexibility needed to
adjust their climate performance, and when the incentives of receiving the additional low-
carbon accreditation are high. Moreover, funds’ efforts pay off: Receiving (losing) the LCD
in quarterly updates that followed the initial publication through September 2019 translates
into positive (negative) flow effects that are comparable to those at the initial introduction.
However, the competitive response of mutual fund managers, tilting portfolios towards
3
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more climate-responsible investments, may reduce risk diversification. In Section 6, we show
that, on average, LCD funds have an idiosyncratic monthly volatility 23 basis points (16%
of the median) higher than non-LCD funds, due to the under-weighting of carbon-intensive
sectors. Hence, during the transition to a low-carbon economy, investors may face a trade-
off between choosing LCD funds and diversification of their portfolios. Importantly, as we
discuss in the text, this result emerges because of the specific design of the LCD.
Our paper contributes to the literature, first, by showing how the revealed (climate)
preferences of investors can trigger a change in the behavior of profit-seeking entities, in
our case mutual funds. Heinkel et al. (2001) theoretically show that if a significant share of
shareholders adopts environmentally conscious investment strategies, it will have an impact
on a firm’s cost of capital. This will, in turn, trigger a change in the environmental practices
of the firm, which will start addressing the preferences of its investors. The mutual fund
industry is an ideal setting to test this mechanism, not only due to its economic importance:
First, fund flows allow us to measure directly the attractiveness to investors/clients of a
specific type of firm products, mutual fund portfolios. Second, while changes in corporate
behavior may in general take time to materialize, fund managers can react quickly to shifts
in the revealed preferences of their clients. These reactions are then observable through
changes in mutual fund holdings.
Second, we advance the understanding of the competitive behavior of mutual funds.
Important prior studies in this area include Berk and Green (2004), Berk and Van Binsbergen
(2015), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Cooper et al. (2005), Donaldson and Piacentino (2018),
Guercio and Reuter (2014), Harris et al. (2015), Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004), Kempf and
Ruenzi (2008), and Wahal and Wang (2011). While all these papers study how mutual funds
4
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compete for flows through traditional financial metrics, such as fees and returns, our paper
is the first to show that they also compete through climate performance.4
Third, we complement the literature on investor behavior, in particular the literature on
whether and why investors prefer socially responsible investment products (e.g., Anderson
and Robinson, 2019, Barber et al., 2019, Bassen et al., 2018, Bauer et al., 2018, Bonnefon
et al., 2019, Renneboog et al., 2011, Riedl and Smeets, 2017).5 Differently from most previous
works, we provide causal evidence of the effects of investor preferences for a specific salient
dimension of sustainability, namely, climate responsibility. The natural experiment that
we analyze is appealing in this respect. Before the introduction of the LCD, investors
already had easy-to-process information about the general sustainability performance of
funds (Hartzmark and Sussman, 2019). Hence, the effect that we identify can be attributed
to the climate preferences of investors, net of both their preferences for sustainability more
broadly defined and of more traditional financial factors.
2 Empirical setting
On April 30, 2018, Morningstar introduced the “Low Carbon Designation” (LCD) for mutual
funds. This label is depicted as a green leaf icon which is visible on the fund’s report, as
shown in Figure 1. While not the first type of sustainability evaluation for funds, the LCD
4Our paper also relates to the broader literature exploring the effects of product market competition in
influencing corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, e.g., Bartling et al. (2014), Fernández-Kranz and
Santaló (2010), Flammer (2015), and Servaes and Tamayo (2013).
5A broader stream of research studies the preferences of investors for socially and environmentally re-
sponsible firms, primarily through the lens of stock prices (e.g., Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009, Hong and
Kostovetsky, 2012, Krüger, 2015, Lins et al., 2017) or through the portfolio holdings of institutional in-
vestors (e.g, Dyck et al., 2019, Fernando et al., 2017, Gibson and Krüger, 2017, Gibson et al., 2019, Krüger
et al., 2019) or both (Ramelli et al., 2019).
5
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is particularly interesting because it specifically aims at helping clients to easily identify
mutual funds with portfolios aligned with the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Details on the methodology underlying the assignment of the LCD are in Morningstar
(2018a,b).6 To receive the LCD, a mutual fund has to comply with two criteria: (1) a
12-month trailing average “Portfolio Carbon Risk Score” below 10 (out of 100); and (2) a
12-month trailing average “Fossil Fuel Involvement” below 7%. The Portfolio Carbon Risk
Score is calculated if more than 67% of a fund’s portfolio assets (based on the combined
market value of bond and equity holdings) have a carbon-risk rating from the ESG research
provider Sustainalytics.
Figure 1: Morningstar Direct snapshot
The portfolio scores are based on issuer-level variables from Sustainalytics, which are
updated on a yearly frequency. According to Sustainalytics, the “Carbon Risk Score” quan-
tifies the portfolio companies’ exposure and management of material carbon issues in their
operations as well as their products and services (Morningstar, 2018b). The management
of carbon issues focuses on portfolio companies’ preparedness and track record in manag-
ing these issues. In Table A1 in the Appendix, we provide summary statistics of firm-level
6For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we take Morningstar’s approach to the assessment of funds’
climate-related performance as given. Our objective is neither to praise nor criticise Morningstar’s method-
ology, but rather to exploit it to study the behavior of both mutual fund clients and mutual fund managers.
6
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Carbon Risk scores by industries. As expected, firms in high-emitting sectors (e.g., Energy,
Materials, and Utilities) are considered those having the highest carbon risks. However,
within all sectors, there is substantial variability of this measure.
Morningstar computes the fund-level Carbon Risk scores by weighting the firm-level
scores by the total investment (debt and equity) that a mutual fund holds at the end of the
quarter in a given company.7 As of April 2018, having a Portfolio Carbon Risk Score below
10 implies being amongst the 29% of funds with the best performance on this dimension.
“Fossil Fuel Involvement” measures the percentage of portfolio firms that derive a signif-
icant share of revenues from activities related to fossil fuels, including thermal coal, oil and
gas, oil sands, shale energy, deep-water production, and Arctic offshore exploration. As of
April 2018, having a 12-months trailing average Fossil Fuel Involvement below 7% represents
a 33% under-weighting of fossil fuel-related companies relative to the global equity universe.
The LCDs were released for the first time at the end of April 2018 and assigned to funds
based on their carbon scores as of the end of March 2018. Responding to our clarifying
questions, Morningstar representatives noted that they did not communicate in advance the
release of the label to either mutual fund managers or their clients. Indeed, the analysis of
pre-publication trends further below is in line with the release of the LCD being unexpected.
The LCDs for the period from January through the end of April 2018 (pre-publication period)
were also released at the end of April 2018, based on the holdings in the previous quarters.
7Chen et al. (2019) argue that many managers of fixed-income mutual funds misreport the credit quality of
their assets to Morningstar to influence its assessments, in particular the Stars ratings. Contrary to the credit
quality of fixed-income assets, the measures underlying the LCD (portfolio carbon risk and portfolio fossil
fuel involvement) are not self-reported by fund managers, but are instead computed by Morningstar based on
funds’ portfolio holdings. Of course, we cannot definitively exclude that some funds decide to misreport their
holdings. However, significant legal and reputational risks are associated with such misreporting. Overall,
therefore, misrepresentation does not seem to be a major concern in our setting.
7
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Morningstar updates the portfolio aggregates of carbon risk metrics on a quarterly basis,
and changes the LCD label assignment accordingly. This setting allows us to study not only
the effects of the initial LCD release, but also the effects of later changes.
3 Data
We obtain survivorship-bias-free data for all open-end mutual funds domiciled in Europe and
USA, both equity and fixed-income, from Morningstar Direct. Our sample period spans April
2017 (one year before the LCD introduction) through September 2019. Mutual funds issue
several share classes to target specific investors groups or geographies, but the underlying
portfolio is the same across share classes, and hence so is the Low Carbon Designation. For
this reason, all our analyses are conducted at the fund level.8
In aggregating data from the share-class to the fund level, we compute funds’ returns
and volatilities as value-weighted average values across different share classes. Fund assets
(in USD) is the sum of the assets under management of a fund in its different share classes.
Other fund-level information (including the assignment of the LCD) is retrieved from the
largest share class of the funds. Funds with more than 50% of assets in institutional share
classes are classified as institutional funds.9
Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), flows are computed as the monthly growth of assets
8However, our fund-flows results continue to hold when using data at the share-class-level (which allows,
for example, for different flows for different share classes), and clustering standard errors at the fund level.
For the results on fund responses, no such robustness check can be conducted because all relevant variables
only vary on the fund level.
9Morningstar classifies as institutional the share classes that meet one of the following criteria: have the
word “institutional” in the name; have a minimum initial purchase of USD 100,000 or more; specifically
address institutional investors or those purchasing on a fiduciary basis, as stated in the fund prospectus. We
define a fund as institutional when more than 50% of assets in share classes are dedicated to institutional
clients.
8
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under management net of reinvested returns. To ensure the robustness of our analysis, we
trim flows at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Moreover, we compute a measure of normalized
flows following Hartzmark and Sussman (2019): First, we split the sample into deciles ac-
cording to fund size. Second, we rank funds according to their net flows within their size
decile and compute percentiles of the net flow rankings. These percentiles correspond to the
normalized flows variable.
Throughout the paper, returns are expressed in percentage points. Our main measure of
returns is the total monthly return as reported by Morningstar. To obtain a relative measure
of returns, we adjusted these for the assets-weighted averages by Morningstar categories (as
done, for instance, by Pástor et al., 2017). We also compute CAPM-adjusted and Fama-
French-adjusted returns using betas estimate through OLS regressions of monthly data from
January 2016 through December 2017.
We compute the return volatility as the standard deviation of returns using a 12-month
rolling window. For each fund, we also collect information on the net expense ratio reported
in the latest prospectus, age, global category (capturing the investment style), Morningstar’s
overall rating (the Morningstar “Stars”, on a 1-5 scale, with 5 to indicate top financial per-
formers), whether the fund is classified as “socially conscious”,10 and its overall sustainability
ratings (the Morningstar “Globes”, on a 1-5 scale, with 5 to indicate top sustainability per-
formers).
To account for the impact that “Stars” have on fund flows (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2008),
we define the variable ∆Stars indicating funds that experienced an upgrade or a downgrade in
10Morningstar classifies as socially conscious any fund that identifies itself as investing according to some
non-economic guidelines, for instance by excluding certain sectors or companies from the investable universe,
or by aiming at selectively investing in good-performing companies based on environmental and social criteria.
9
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the “Star” rating from the previous month, considering observations with continuing missing
Stars ratings as no change. Similarly, to account for the impact of the generic sustainability
rating (Ammann et al., 2018; Hartzmark and Sussman, 2019), we define the variables ∆1
Globe and ∆5 Globes as the monthly changes of dummy variables indicating funds in the
two extreme sustainability categories (1 Globe and 5 Globes), considering the observations
with continuing missing sustainability ratings as no change.
- Table 1 -
Panel A of Table 1 shows summary statistics for fund-month observations from April
2017 through September 2019 for which information of flows and LCD is available. Panel
B provides a snapshot of the statistics as of the end of April 2018. The sample covers
some 20,000 funds, of which around 14% obtained the Low Carbon Designation. The mean
net flows in our sample period are negative, partially reflecting the overall shift of mutual
fund clients towards index funds and ETFs. The average annual expense ratio is about 1.1
percentage points.11 10% of funds self-classify themselves as socially conscious. Interestingly,
from the population of socially conscious funds, only a third received the LCD. Around a
quarter of all funds are primarily sold to institutional clients.
- Table 2 -
Table 2 shows the geographical distribution of the sample as of the end of April 2018.
Around 13,000 funds are domiciled in Europe, and 7,000 are domiciled in the USA. The
share of funds that received the initial Low Carbon Designation is 15% in Europe and only
11Information on this variable is missing for most of the sample as its annual reporting is compulsory only
in the USA. In order not to significantly restrict our European sample, we do not include this variable in
our main regressions, but our findings hold even when we do.
10
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12% in the USA. The preference of US funds for local investments partially explains this
difference. Since Sustainalytics covers less than 1,000 US firms, many funds do not reach
the minimum carbon-risk coverage of 67% of portfolio assets needed to obtain the label.12
- Table 3 -
Appendix Table A2 shows the correlations between the variables in our main sample. On
average, low-carbon-designated funds have higher assets under management, volatility, and
expense ratios. The LCD is also positively correlated with both the Morningstar generic
sustainability ratings (“Globes”) and the overall performance ratings (“Stars”). However,
as shown in Table 3, mutual funds can be awarded the LCD despite having the lowest
sustainability rating, or the lowest performance rating. This confirms that the eco-label we
study provides investors with information on the climate-related performance of funds that
could not be retrieved from other ratings already available on Morningstar.
When studying the active response of mutual fund managers to the LCD release, we
exclude from our sample both explicit and closet indexers (around 12% of funds), which do
not, by definition, follow active investment strategies.13 We identify explicit indexers using
the Morningstar definition, and closet indexers using the Active Share measures of Cremers
and Petajisto (2009) and Cremers et al. (2016). In line with the previous studies, we use an
active share below 60% as a cutoff for identifying a closet indexer. However, the portfolios
of explicit and closet indexers still provide useful information, since we can use them as a
benchmark for the changes we observe in the portfolio holdings of active funds.
12If we restrict the sample to cover only eligible funds, we find that both in Europe and USA, 24% of
funds receive the LCD. All our subsequent results are virtually unchanged if we focus only on these funds.
13As shown by Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Cremers et al. (2016), a large number of so-called active
funds are actually “closet indexers”. Such funds are marketed as being actively managed, but their portfolios
are mostly allocated passively according to an index.
11
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4 Investors prefer low-carbon funds
This section explores the initial reaction of mutual funds clients to the Low Carbon Designa-
tion (LCD). On the one hand, if investors are not concerned about the climate performance
of mutual funds or already had other means to express their climate-conscious preferences,
we expect to see no effect on fund flows after the introduction of the LCD. On the other
hand, if investors do care about the climate-related performance of mutual funds and the
LCD allows them to better express these preferences, we expect funds that Morningstar
labeled as low-carbon to experience abnormal high flows after April 2018.
We start this section by graphically depicting flows for low-carbon and not-low-carbon
funds. We then formally test whether investors reward low-carbon funds. In the final part
of this section, we explore the mechanisms behind the observed effects.
4.1 Graphical evidence
Figure 2 illustrates the average equally-weighted monthly net flows of funds that were cat-
egorized as low-carbon at the end of April 2018 and into or out of funds that did not
(not-low-carbon), from April 2017 through December 2018. Importantly, information about
the LCD became available to investors only from the beginning of May 2018. We call the
period April 2017 through April 2018 the pre-publication period. For now, we focus on
the post-publication period through December 2018 to document the initial reshuffling of
flows caused by the release of the LCD. Section 5.5 investigates the fund-flow effects of LCD
upgrades and downgrades over an extended sample period through September 2019.
12
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Figure 2: Effect of the LCD on fund flows
These figures show the equally-weighted average monthly flows of funds designated low-
carbon at the end of April 2018 (solid green lines) and of conventional funds (dashed red line)
domiciled in Europe (top) and in the USA (bottom), from April 2017 through December
2018. Flows are computed as of end of the month. The Low Carbon Designation was
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Consider first the top chart, showing the European sample. During the pre-publication
period, the net flows in funds that would be later designated low-carbon are very similar to
the average flows in other funds. In other words, the two groups show common trends. (It is
a coincidence that in this analysis based on raw data, even the levels closely coincide, though
this is not required for the difference-in-differences analysis to be appropriate.) With the
release of the LCDs at the end of April 2018, low-carbon-designated funds started enjoying
a clear and persistent increase of flows compared to other funds.
In the USA (bottom chart), funds with low-carbon features show lower flows than con-
ventional funds in the pre-publication period but, more importantly, again following very
similar fluctuations. Here, too, the release of the LCDs seems to have initiated a relative
boost of flows for LCD funds in May 2018. In the following months there was some variation,
though by the last four months of 2018, LCD funds had caught up to non-LCD funds in
terms of monthly fund flows.
4.2 Empirical strategy
Figure 2 provides suggestive evidence that in the post-publication period, mutual funds that
receive the Low Carbon Designation experience higher flows than mutual funds that do not
receive it. To formally test that hypothesis, we run the following OLS regression explaining
fund i’s flows in month t from April 2017 through December 2018:
Flowsi,t = α + β1 LCDi × Postt + β2 LCDi + γ′Xi,t−1 + δi,t + ηi + εi,t. (1)
14
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The main explanatory variable is the difference-in-differences interaction term LCDi × Postt.
LCDi identifies funds that received the LCD at its initial release. Postt is an indicator
variable equal to 1 for months after April 2018, and 0 for all prior months. Xi,t−1 is a vector of
time-varying lagged fund-level controls that, based on previous literature, may influence fund
flows of LCD recipients in a differential manner. These are monthly returns, the logarithm of
assets under management, return volatility, the fund’s age, the fund’s entrance or exit in the
two extreme sustainability rating (Globes) categories, and changes of Morningstar’s overall
assessment of the fund (Stars).14 δi,t represents month-by-style (Morningstar category) fixed
effects. ηi is a set of country dummies (based on the fund’s domicile). εi,t is the error
term. Standard errors are clustered along months to account for cross-sectional dependence
between observations.
4.3 Regression results
The regression results with our main specification are reported in columns (1), (3), and
(6) of Table 4, using the full sample, European funds, and US funds, respectively. The
coefficient on the DID interaction term is positive and highly statistically significant in each
of the three samples. The coefficient in column (1) indicates that the assignment of the Low
Carbon Designation is associated with an average 0.23 percentage points higher difference in
net flows compared to the pre-publication period, which corresponds to an increase of eight
14We use the change in sustainability and overall ratings rather than the absolute value because, as also
noted in Hartzmark and Sussman (2019), if these rating systems are in equilibrium – e.g., existing investors
have already sorted in low and high-sustainability funds according to their preferences, after an initial phase
of reallocation – there is no reason to expect a continued flows-effect of ratings without further changes.
That said, the results also hold just controlling for the number of globes and the number of stars. We also
re-run the DID analysis weighting the observations by assets, ruling out the possibility that the coefficients
are driven by small funds. The same inferences hold.
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percent of the interquartile range of monthly flows. The effect is economically important
also when compared to the effect of the main focus of the mutual funds literature so far,
returns. A one standard deviation stronger performance in terms of monthly returns yields
3.19 × 0.15 = 0.48 percentage points more flows. In other words, the LCD is worth almost
half a standard deviation in returns. When compounded over the eight months from May
through December 2018, the flow premium associated with the LCD can be quantified in an
increase of around 2% in the assets under management.
The coefficients of the control variables are in line with previous literature. In particular,
flows are negatively related to age and assets under management, and positively related to
past financial performance (Patel et al., 1994).15
It is worth noticing that the statistically and economically important net flows boost
caused by the LCD happens on top of the effects of the general sustainability ratings doc-
umented in Ammann et al. (2018) and Hartzmark and Sussman (2019). We also expand
the findings of Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) in our sample period: Upgrades (downgrades)
in the Morningstar overall rating (Stars) are followed by a statistically significant increase
(decrease) in flows.16
To limit the potential effects of size in determining monthly flows, we re-run the main
DID analyses using normalized flows as dependent variable. The corresponding regression
15Virtually unchanged results are obtained when using the returns adjusted for the average performance
by category, also including quarterly and annual returns in the regressions, and using CAPM-adjusted or
Fama-French-adjusted returns. We primarily use raw returns because recent research shows that mutual
fund investors do not rely on asset pricing models for their investment decisions (Ben-David et al., 2019).
16Ben-David et al. (2019) show that Stars ratings are a major determinant of fund flows across US mutual
funds, followed only by recent past returns. In Huang et al. (2019), investors rationally respond to changes
in Stars ratings even though these ratings, being exclusively based on past financial performance, do not
provide them with any new information. In their model, investors take Stars ratings as reputation signals
of funds’ informational advantage.
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results are reported in models (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4. The effect of receiving the Low
Carbon Designation is again strongly statistically and economically significant: Net of the
effects of control variables, on average, low-carbon funds move up 1.94 percentiles in net
flows after April 2018.
- Table 4 -
We conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure the reliability of our findings. First, in
Table A3 we ensure that our results hold – and indeed are even larger in magnitude – when
adding fund fixed effects to the regressions. Second, we interact all control variables with
Post to allow for potential changes over time of the effects on flows of fund characteristics
other than the LCD. As shown in Table A4 in the Appendix, the results continue to hold.
Third, we add to the regression the two scores used to allocate the LCD – the Portfolio
Carbon Risk (CR) and Fossil Fuel involvement (FFI) – and their interaction with Post. This
test also provides potential insights into whether investors also responded, conditional on a
fund receiving or not receiving the label, to the level of the underlying climate performance.
No robust pattern emerges in Table A5 in the Appendix in this respect. Importantly for the
purposes of this paper, the results for our main coefficient of interest, the interaction of LCD
with Post, remain virtually the same, indicating that it was the LCD that drove investor
responses.
Finally, we repeat our analysis using a shorter pre-publication period, starting from
December 2017. This allows us to exploit the availability of the LCDs for the period from
December 2017 through April 2018, computed by applying the LCD methodology to the
historical holdings. This setting allows to further rule out the possibility that the flow-
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effect of the LCD may be due to portfolio characteristics not explicitly related to climate
performance. Results available on request show that our inferences hold when using the
shorter pre-publication period (see Figure A1 in the Appendix for a graphical illustration).
Overall, our findings soundly reject the null hypothesis of no response to the introduction
of the Low Carbon Designation. Investors in the mutual fund industry rewarded funds
labeled as low-carbon with additional fund flows.
4.4 Why do investors prefer low-carbon funds?
Investors may prefer low-carbon funds mainly for two not-mutually-exclusive reasons: They
may interpret the LCD as a signal of stronger future performance and/or they may want to
express some climate-conscious preferences.
We first consider the relative financial performance of LCD funds. From Appendix Ta-
ble A6 we see that, between May 2018 and September 2019, LCD funds, on average, ex-
perienced higher abnormal returns than conventional funds, net of the effect of basic fund
characteristics (size, volatility, age, and investment style).17 Although the observation pe-
riod is too short to make definitive statements regarding performance, this observed out-
performance of LCD funds may raise the concern that the flow-effect of the LCD is driven
by some already-available information on funds correlated with future returns, information
that, however, had nothing to do with climate performance.
To control for this possibility, we run a “perfect foresight” test on our baseline specifica-
tion. Specifically, we add the fund’s future quarterly return to the regressions. Obviously,
17This relationship holds both for CAPM as well as for Fama-French adjusted returns, where both sets of
returns are estimated using monthly regressions from January 2016 through December 2017. An unreported
propensity-score matching exercise on fund characteristics also shows that the average LCD fund outperforms
a similar Not-LCD fund.
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this information was not actually available to investors at that time. The rationale for this
exercise is the following. To the extent that our results so far are reflecting investors’ an-
ticipation of future performance, or the effect of some unobserved variables correlated with
future returns, the effect of the LCD should be absorbed by the coefficient on the actual
look-ahead future quarterly return. In Table 5, we find that this is not the case. The regres-
sion coefficient on LCD is hardly affected by the addition of future returns. (Similar results
are obtained when using CAPM- or Fama-French-adjusted returns.)
- Table 5 -
Next, we investigate whether investors acted on their preferences. To this end, in Table 6,
we perform a cross-sectional analysis along some relevant fund characteristics.
- Table 6 -
First, we compare the sub-samples of retail and institutional funds. We expect the
introduction of the LCD to have a smaller marginal impact on funds dedicated to institutional
clients, as these investors are less likely to rely on an eco-label to take investment decisions.
This is because institutional clients ought to have both the means and the ability to compute
the climate risk of their investments using other sources. Panel A of Table 6 confirms this
conjecture. Both in Europe and in the USA, retail clients of mutual funds are more responsive
to the introduction of the LCD than institutional clients.
Second, in Panel B, we compare funds that during the previous quarter had a poor
(bottom quartile) financial performance relative to their category to those that had a good
(top quartile) relative financial performance. Fund-flow benefits of obtaining the LCD are
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significantly higher for poorly performing funds than for strong performers.18 This behavior
is in line with prior works showing that socially- and environmentally-conscious investors
are less sensitive to past negative returns than conventional investors (e.g., Benson and
Humphrey, 2008, El Ghoul and Karoui, 2017, Renneboog et al., 2011, Riedl and Smeets,
2017).
Finally, in Panel C, we investigate the flows effect of the LCD on low-sustainability (1 or
2 Globes) vs. high-sustainability (4 or 5 Globes) funds. We find that the DID coefficients are
significant only for low-sustainability funds. Thus, the funds more likely to benefit from the
new eco-label are those not already having other means to target the segment of socially- and
environmentally-conscious clients. Investors may interpret obtaining the LCD as a substitute
for having a high sustainability rating. However, the substitution is hardly perfect, as seen
by the fact that even controlling for Globes changes (or Globes as such), LCD has a distinct
and quantitatively important effect.
Overall, our cross-sectional tests are consistent with the fund-flows effect being driven,
at least in part, by mutual fund investors having non-pecuniary preferences for climate-
conscious investment products.
5 Funds tilt portfolios towards low-carbon firms
The prior section has shown that investors in the mutual fund industry have preferences for
climate-conscious investments. Do mutual fund managers react to these revealed preferences?
18Similar coefficients are obtained when using the portfolio alphas with respect to the CAPM and Fama-
French models. The overall results of the role of prior fund performance are primarily driven by the European
sub-sample. One explanation for this could be that, to some extent, US investors view climate-conscious
investment combined with poor performance as a signal for agency issues (Barnea and Rubin, 2010).
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We expect fund managers that missed the label to compete for flows from climate-conscious
investors by shifting their portfolios toward more climate-friendly firms.
We start the section with graphical evidence. We follow this by a formal analysis of how
mutual funds move towards low-carbon firms and argue that this is because they compete
for flows through climate performance. Finally, we show that the efforts of mutual funds
indeed pay off in terms of fund flows.
5.1 Graphical evidence
To build intuition, Figure 3 shows coefficients of quarterly regressions of Carbon Risk of
active European and US mutual funds over our sample period on NotLCD (an indicator for
not receiving the LCD at its introduction) and LCD (an indicator for receiving the label).
The regressions also control for category fixed effects.19
The figure shows that before the introduction of the LCD, Carbon Risk followed parallel
trends in both groups of funds. This suggests that fund managers were not aware of the
impending introduction of the label, or at least of the criteria upon which it was awarded.
After the introduction of the label, both groups of funds decreased their carbon risk, but the
drop in carbon risk is much more pronounced in the NotLCD group.
19It is important to control for categories because climate performance varies widely within categories.
For example, the average CR for “Energy Sector Equity” funds is 36.7, whereas for “Consumer Goods &
Services Sector Equity” it is 6.2.
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Figure 3: Mutual funds’ responses
This picture depicts the coefficients of quarterly regressions of Carbon Risk on an indicator
variable for not receiving the LCD at its introduction, “Not-Low-Carbon”, one for receiving
the label, “Low-Carbon”, and category fixed effects (but no intercept). The first panel
uses all active mutual funds (Active Share ≥60%) domiciled in Europe that are not explicit
indexers. The second panel uses the same type of funds domiciled in the USA. The sample
period is in both cases between March 2017 and September 2019.
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5.2 Empirical strategy
To formally test whether the release of the LCD had an effect on mutual funds’ behavior,
we estimate difference-in-differences regressions. Here, it is intuitive to use as the treatment
group those mutual funds that did not receive the LCD at its initial release. Specifically, we
run the following regression explaining fund i’s Carbon Risk in quarter q for quarters March
2017 through September 2019:
CRi,q = α + β1 NotLCDi × Postq + β2 NotLCDi + γ′Xi,q−1 + δi,q + ηi + εi,t. (2)
The main explanatory variable is the difference-in-differences interaction term NotLCDi ×
Postq. NotLCDi identifies funds that did not receive the LCD at its initial release. Postq
is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the quarters the LCD was in place, i.e., 2018-Q2
through 2019-Q2, and 0 for all prior quarters. Xi,q−1 includes time-varying lagged fund-level
controls, quarterly returns, the logarithm of assets under management, return volatility, and
the fund’s age.20 δi,q includes quarter-by-style (Morningstar category) fixed effects. ηi is a
set of country dummies (based on the fund’s domicile). εi,q is the error term.
Besides rebalancing activities, there are two additional ways through which the climate
performance of mutual funds may change. First, these can originate from changes in the
underlying carbon risk of firms. Second, they can originate from changes in market values
of portfolio assets. We can exclude the first channel for most of our sample period since
Sustainalytics updates the firms’ climate scores on a yearly frequency, and all portfolio
20Our results remain virtually unchanged if we add the fund’s entrance or exit in the two extreme sus-
tainability rating (Globes) categories, and changes of Morningstar’s overall assessment of the fund (Stars)
to the regressions. We choose not to include these variables, as they could vary as a consequence of funds
adjusting their climate-performance.
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scores up to Q1-2019 are based on the firm-level carbon performance of 2017.21 To account
for the second channel, similarly to Leippold and Rueegg (2019), we benchmark the climate
performance of active funds with that of funds that by definition, do not actively rebalance
their portfolios, i.e., outright and closet indexers (together called passive funds).
Thus, for each quarter, abnormal CR is computed as the difference between the active
fund’s climate performance and the average climate performance of the passive funds in the
same category. This way, we account for systematic differences between categories and across
time. Additionally, to capture differences in levels, we perform the adjustment by the degree
to which a fund fulfills the criteria for obtaining the LCD, i.e., ∅CR≤10, ∅FFI≤7%. We





q,k , ∀ fund i, quarter q, category k, and
τ ∈ {∅CR ≤ 10, ∅FFI ≤ 7%, both, neither.}
(3)
Analogously to equations 2 and 3, we also run regressions explaining (abnormal) Fossil
Fuel Involvement.
5.3 Regression results
The regressions using (gross) Carbon Risk as the dependent variables are reported in columns
(1), (3), and (5) of Panel A of Table 7, using the full sample, European funds, and US funds
respectively. Columns (2), (4), and (6) use as dependent variable the abnormal climate
performance, i.e., after controlling for the average CR of passive funds.
- Table 7 -
21Our results remain virtually unchanged if we drop the observations from 2019.
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Throughout, the coefficient on the DID interaction term is negative and highly statis-
tically significant in each of the three samples. For example, the coefficient in column (1)
indicates that not receiving the LCD at its initial release is associated with an average de-
crease in CR of 0.48 (11% of a standard deviation) above that observed in funds that received
the LCD in April 2018. The size of the effect is similar in European and US funds. Moreover,
when we account for differential changes in market capitalization of the underlying assets in
columns (2), (4), and (6), we find that the size of the coefficient is smaller, but the economic
significance is somewhat stronger (13% of a standard deviation).
To better understand how funds achieved this change and to assess the economic signif-
icance of these changes, in Table 8 we study the % Assets Under Management that funds
held in negligible, low, medium, high, and severe Carbon Risk (CR) firms. These categories
correspond to firms with a CR score of 0, 0.01-9.99, 10-29.99, 30-49.99, and >50 respectively.
To lower the CR of their portfolios, fund managers increased their holdings in negligible and
low CR firms by 0.81% and 0.94% and reduced their holdings in medium, high, and severe
CR firms by 0.98%, 0.34%, and 0.21% per quarter. In other words, both new investments
in low-carbon-risk assets and divestments from high-carbon-risk assets contributed to the
overall result.
- Table 8 -
Panel B of Table 7 reveals a similar picture for fossil fuel involvement. Overall, when com-
pared to funds that received the LCD, Not-LCD funds under-weighted their FFI by 0.29%
(4% of a standard deviation) per quarter, or 1.75 percentage points when aggregated over
the six quarters the LCD was in place. The size of the coefficient in the USA is in line with
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the results in the European and the full sample. When we account for differential changes
in market capitalization in columns (2), (4), and (6), we find that the actual improvement
amounts to a 0.90% decrease in Abnormal FFI (16% of a standard deviation). The reason
why adjusting for market trends is particularly important for FFI is that, in contrast to
Carbon Risk, this variable is sector-specific and particularly prone to market swings.22 We
remove this bias when we control for the climate-performance of passive funds. The coef-
ficients of Abnormal FFI in all samples are significant, though European funds appear to
reduce their FFI slightly more aggressively.
We conduct a series of checks to ensure the reliability of our findings. Panel A of Appendix
Table A7 includes Fund FEs to the baseline specification. We do this to account for potential
omitted variables that remain constant for a given fund. Despite having a brief time series,
the coefficients of our analysis remain significant, albeit slightly smaller. Panel B runs a
fully interacted model of our baseline regression. We interact all controls with Post to allow
for a change in the way the covariates interact with the climate performance of funds before
and after the LCD was introduced. Our findings remain robust to this specification as well.
These robustness tests mitigate omitted variables and selection bias concerns.
Overall, the evidence provided in this section is consistent with fund managers responding
to the revealed preferences of their clients by improving the climate-performance of their
portfolios.
22Consider an energy sector fund with a FFI of 70% and USD 100m in assets under management. Suppose
that the fossil-fuel dependent stocks in its portfolio were to halve in value, whereas the value of the other
stocks remains unchanged. If the fund were passive, its FFI would now be 0.5*70m /(0.5*70m + 30m),
around 54%.
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5.4 Is the response of funds strategic?
What might drive fund managers’ behavior? While it is difficult to infer the motivations of
fund managers from the regressions, additional tests yield some insights. If the response of
fund managers is strategic, it ought to be stronger when, first, adjusting portfolio climate-
performance is easier and, second, when there is more to gain from obtaining the additional
visibility tied to receiving the label.
First, fund managers should be better able to improve their climate-performance when
they had high flows in the previous quarter, as this will give them additional room for
maneuver. In Panel A of Table 9, we split the sample along the top and bottom quartiles of
fund flows in the quarter before the LCD was introduced. The coefficients in the first two
models are negative but smaller than the corresponding ones in the last two models. This
supports that having experienced high flows in the previous quarter enhances the ability of
funds to improve their climate performance.23
Second, young funds should have a stronger incentive to get the label since they are less
known. The LCD could help them attract the attention of climate-conscious investors.24 In
Panel B of Table 9, we split the sample based on fund age into young (bottom quartile)
and old (top quartile) funds. Young funds reduce their Abnormal CR and FFI almost three
times more than old funds do, confirming our hypothesis.
- Table 9 -
Taken together, these findings suggest that mutual fund managers see obtaining the LCD
as a way to compete for the flows of climate-conscious investors.
23We find a similar effect when splitting the sample based on past abnormal performance.
24Wahal and Wang (2011) show that the competitive behavior of new entrant funds is particularly intense.
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5.5 Do funds’ efforts pay off?
We have shown that investors value climate responsibility, and that in response, mutual fund
managers adjust their holdings. Do these reallocation efforts of fund managers pay off in the
sense that they are able to attract additional flows beyond the initial LCD release?
Morningstar updates the LCD on a quarterly basis, with one-month delay from the end
of the quarter. Our sample period covers five quarterly updates in the post-publication
period. As shown in Panel A of Table 10, while the large majority of funds had their
LCD classification confirmed, in each of these updates a small fraction of funds did switch
from LCD to not-LCD, or vice-versa. What are the effects of these LCD upgrades and
downgrades?
We define, for each fund, the indicators LCD Downgrade and LCD Upgrade. These binary
indicators are equal to 1 for months following an LCD downgrade or upgrade, respectively,
and 0 otherwise. The results in Panel B of Table 10 indicate that subsequent LCD upgrades
and downgrades also have a significant impact on net flows. This is particularly the case for
European funds. In the USA, where there are fewer “switchers” compared to the European
sample, only the coefficient on LCD upgrades is statistically significant.
- Table 10 -
Overall, these result indicate that managers of funds that are not considered low-carbon
can potentially access an important source of flows as long as they manage to rebalance their
portfolios in a climate-responsible direction successfully.
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6 Low-carbon funds have higher idiosyncratic risk
One traditional argument against responsible investing is that the adoption of environmen-
tal and social criteria restricts the investable universe, hence preventing risk sharing from a
mean-variance perspective (Markowitz, 1952).25 Contrary to this view, some evidence sug-
gests that sustainable funds can obtain lower idiosyncratic risk than conventional funds by
picking, within each sector, companies with lower firm-specific risks.26 This debate raises the
question whether LCD funds have lower or higher idiosyncratic volatility than other funds.
We compute a fund’s idiosyncratic risk as the standard deviation of monthly residuals
from a Fama-French three-factor model run over the post-publication period from May 2018
through September 2019.27 We require at least 9 observations of monthly returns.
In Table 11, we then regress idiosyncratic risk on LCD and controls. In these regressions,
we also include the manager’s tenure to account for potential effects of career concerns on
the manager’ willingness to hold unsystematic risks (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999).
- Table 11 -
In column (1), we find that investors in LCD funds experience a 23 basis points higher
idiosyncratic risk than otherwise-similar conventional funds. This difference is economically
meaningful as it corresponds to 16% of the median idiosyncratic risk. Adding controls for
categories and for the Active Share explains some of the difference in risk, but a sizable
difference remains even with all controls included (see columns (2) to (4)).
25For instance, Geczy et al. (2005) study the diversification cost of investing in socially responsible funds
over the period 1963-2001. They provide evidence of significant costs, in terms of lower certainly-equivalent
returns, of imposing SRI constraints in the portfolio construction.
26For instance, Godfrey et al. (2009) show that firms with more advanced CSR practices have lower
idiosyncratic volatility.
27Very similar results are obtained when looking at funds’ volatilities over the full sample period.
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By contrast, funds with 4 or 5 Globes, i.e., funds receiving a high generic sustainability
rating, have lower idiosyncratic risk than their less sustainable peers. The contrasting effects
on idiosyncratic volatility of the Morningstar Globes and the LCD are due to a key method-
ological difference of these two labels: While the Globes are assigned within each category
based on “best-in-class” sustainability scores, the LCD rewards funds that under-weight or
avoid carbon-intensive sectors. The higher volatility of LCD funds emerges as a natural
by-product of their smaller sectoral diversification.
This result raises a cautionary flag regarding possible unintended effects of this type of
eco-labels. Donaldson and Piacentino (2018) model how mutual funds compete for flows
on the base of public information, e.g., by committing to invest exclusively in AAA-rated
assets. Such competition lowers the overall welfare of investors by preventing risk sharing.28
Similarly, in our setting, competing for flows through climate responsibility may give rise
to social inefficiencies insofar as the incentives created by the label trigger a “race to the
bottom” in terms of portfolio diversification. This effect should be assessed alongside the
“race to the top” in terms of reduction of climate-related risks documented in Section 5.
7 Conclusion
Around the introduction of Morningstar’s Low Carbon Designation (LCD) label in April
2018, mutual funds directly experienced the intensity of investors’ preferences for climate-
responsible investments: Keeping other factors constant, funds labeled as low-carbon enjoyed
28This finding relates to the broader literature studying asset management in a principal-agent framework.
For other relevant works on how fund managers strategically adjust the riskiness of the portfolio in response
to incentive considerations, see Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Palomino and Prat (2003).
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a cumulated relative increase of 2% of assets under management from May through the end
of December 2018 relative to funds that were not labeled as low-carbon. Effectively, investors
valued climate performance (receiving the LCD) as being equivalent to one half of a standard
deviation of financial performance.
Changes in culinary habits and trends inspire chefs worldwide to adapt their menus to the
new preferences of their clients. Similarly, with the chefs of the financial industry, investors’
call for a low-carbon diet in their portfolios did not fall on deaf ears: Mutual funds that
initially did not receive the LCD subsequently reduced (increased) their holdings in high
(low) carbon-intensity companies. In other words, the incentives created by the release of
the LCD accelerated climate-related investment strategies in the mutual fund industry.
The high-carbon assets shunned by mutual funds seeking to be considered low-carbon
do not disappear, but are picked up by other investors. However, this type of divestment is
likely to increase the cost of capital for high-carbon firms, much like the divestment from “sin
stocks” by certain norm-constrained investors increases the cost of capital (and the expected
returns) of companies involved in alcohol, tobacco, or gambling-related activities (Hong and
Kacperczyk, 2009). Whether and how this will induce high-carbon firms to attempt to
convert their business models toward cleaner business activities remains unclear.29 A full
analysis, including welfare considerations, is outside the scope of this paper. Even with
this caveat, we believe that the results have important implications for fund managers,
policy-makers and investors. First, they alert active fund managers to the importance of
sustainability as a key competitive edge, especially in light of the return and fee pressure
29For instance, in Oehmke and Opp (2020) socially responsible investors can indeed lead firms to adopt
clean production technologies, but only under certain conditions. In particular, in their model, socially
responsible investors need to have a broad mandate – i.e., the ability to also invest in “dirty” firms – in order
to generate impact.
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coming from index funds and ETFs. Second, our analyses can inform policy-makers and
investors of the potential effectiveness of eco-labeling schemes in re-orienting capital flows.
On the one hand, they “work” in the sense of inducing desired behavioral responses of
financial intermediaries. On the other hand, certain designs of eco-labels – such as the
LCD – incentivize funds to reduce diversification, to the detriment of investors who do not
consequently adjust their portfolios. Effective instruments utilize the competitive behavior
of financial intermediaries to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy, but should
avoid such undesired effects.
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Fernández-Kranz, Daniel, and Juan Santaló, 2010, When necessity becomes a virtue: The effect
of product market competition on corporate social responsibility, Journal of Economics & Man-
agement Strategy 19, 453–487.
Fernando, Chitru S., Mark P. Sharfman, and Vahap B. Uysal, 2017, Corporate environmental
policy and shareholder value: Following the smart money, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 52, 2023–2051.
Flammer, Caroline, 2015, Does product market competition foster corporate social responsibility?
Evidence from trade liberalization, Strategic Management Journal 36, 1469–1485.
Geczy, Christopher, Robert F. Stambaugh, and David Levin, 2005, Investing in socially responsible
mutual funds, Working paper.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of active mutual funds domiciled in Europe and USA for which infor-
mation on the Low Carbon Designation (LCD) and flows is available. Panel A covers all
fund-month observations from April 2017 through September 2019, while Panel B provides
a snapshot as of the end of April 2018. LCD is a dummy variable indicating funds that
obtained the Low Carbon Designation at the end of April 2018. CR and FFI are the funds’
carbon risk and fossil fuel involvement. Abn CR and Abn FFI are the funds’ climate per-
formance after controlling for differential market performance. Flows (in percentage points)
is the monthly growth of assets net of reinvested returns. Normalized flows are computed
following Hartzmark and Sussman (2019). Return is the monthly net return. Log assets is
the log of AUM in USD. Volatility is the standard deviation of returns in the previous 12
months. Expense ratio is the annual percentage of assets deducted for fund expenses. Age is
the number of years since the inception of the oldest share class. Globes is the Morningstar
sustainability rating on a 1-5 scale. Stars is the overall Morningstar rating system on a 1-5
scale. ∆1 Globe and ∆5 Globes indicate funds entering (1) or exiting (-1) the 1 Globe and
5 Globes category in a given month. ∆Stars indicates if a fund received a downgrade or
an upgrade in the Morningstar rating system (Stars). Socially conscious is a dummy vari-
able for funds that label themselves as socially conscious in either their name or prospectus.
Institutional is a dummy variable for funds with more than 90% of assets in institutional
share classes. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of residuals from a Fama-French
three-factor model run over the period from May 2018 through September 2019, for funds
with at least 9 observations of monthly returns.
Panel A: From April 2017 through September 2019
N min p25 mean p50 p75 max sd
LCD 584,654 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35
CR 314,976 0.00 8.60 10.70 10.38 12.18 58.59 4.48
FFI 502,524 0.00 1.95 6.70 5.31 8.86 100.00 8.07
Abn CR 117,963 -32.87 -1.01 0.02 -0.06 0.96 35.49 2.49
Abn FFI 180,029 -89.84 -2.33 -0.48 -0.45 1.18 83.20 5.71
Flows 584,654 -19.55 -1.60 0.04 -0.24 1.28 30.68 4.16
Normalized flows 584,654 1.00 26.00 49.96 50.00 74.00 100.00 27.99
Return 584,654 -99.71 -0.83 0.38 0.43 1.93 26.59 3.19
Log assets 584,654 4.69 17.10 18.55 18.56 19.97 26.02 2.03
Volatility 584,654 0.00 1.29 2.55 2.33 3.48 28.72 1.64
Expense ratio 314,293 -0.25 0.67 1.09 1.01 1.42 15.15 0.67
Age 584,654 0.16 5.45 13.55 11.84 19.08 119.32 10.20
Globes 392,887 1.00 2.00 3.05 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.13
Stars 364,201 1.00 2.00 3.20 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.06
∆1 Globe 584,654 -1.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13
∆5 Globes 584,654 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13
∆Stars 584,654 -1.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.30
Socially conscious 584,654 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31
Institutional 584,654 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.43
[Continued on the next page]
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[Continued from the previous page]
Panel B: End of April 2018
N min p25 mean p50 p75 max sd
LCD 20,077 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35
CR 11,879 0.00 9.22 11.20 10.88 12.60 57.26 4.50
FFI 19,369 0.00 1.89 6.39 5.06 8.49 100.00 7.75
Abn CR 11,385 -32.87 -0.90 0.10 0.00 1.00 35.49 2.59
Abn FFI 17,551 -85.70 -2.03 -0.34 -0.37 1.21 67.30 5.69
Flows 20,077 -19.39 -2.26 -0.89 -1.37 0.04 30.48 3.99
Normalized flows 20,077 1.00 26.00 50.15 50.00 74.00 100.00 28.07
Return 20,077 -9.79 0.03 1.59 1.18 3.03 15.91 2.23
Log assets 20,077 5.29 17.13 18.57 18.58 19.99 25.93 2.03
Volatility 20,077 0.00 1.24 2.09 2.22 2.76 16.21 1.11
Expense ratio 10,492 -0.21 0.67 1.10 1.01 1.42 14.53 0.69
Age 20,077 0.16 5.05 13.20 11.46 18.73 118.24 10.21
Globes 13,567 1.00 2.00 3.02 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.14
Stars 15,223 1.00 3.00 3.21 3.00 4.00 5.00 1.06
∆1 Globe 20,077 -1.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.14
∆5 Globes 20,077 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.14
∆Stars 20,077 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.33
Socially conscious 20,077 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31
Institutional 20,077 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.43
Idiosyncratic risk 19,982 0.00 0.80 1.67 1.43 2.27 49.35 1.29
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Table 2: Geographical distribution of funds
This table shows the geographical distribution of funds included in the sample, with the
share of funds that obtained the Morningstar Low Carbon Designation. Standard deviations
and 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of flows for each area are reported to facilitate the
interpretation of regression results that follow. The table covers all funds included in the
sample as of April 2018. Portfolio Carbon Risk Scores are assigned by Morningstar only
to funds with more than 67% of portfolio assets in companies covered by Sustainalytics in
terms of carbon-risk rating (Morningstar, 2018b).
Flows
Area of domicile N Fraction of LCD funds p25 p50 p75 sd
Europe 13,073 0.15 -2.71 -1.80 -0.62 4.07
USA 7,004 0.12 -1.12 -0.28 0.72 3.62
Total 20,077 0.14 -2.26 -1.37 0.04 3.99
Table 3: Morningstar LCD, sustainability, and overall ratings
This table shows the absolute frequencies of funds without and with the Low Carbon Des-
ignation (LCD) along the Morningstar sustainability “Globes” ratings (Panel A) and the
Morningstar overall “Stars” ratings (Panel B) as of April 2018.
Panel A: Morningstar sustainability ratings (“Globes”)
LCD 1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 1,232 2,495 3,817 2,388 1,078 11,010
1 216 433 819 682 407 2,557
Total 1,448 2,928 4,636 3,070 1,485 13,567
% of LCD funds 14.92% 17.35% 18.77% 22.21% 27.41% 18.85%
Panel B: Morningstar overall ratings (“Stars”)
LCD 1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 755 2,481 4,643 3,505 1,427 12,811
1 96 431 804 729 352 2,412
Total 851 2,912 5,447 4,234 1,779 15,223
% of LCD funds 11.28% 14.80% 14.76% 17.22% 19.80% 15.84%
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Table 4: Investors prefer low-carbon funds
This table shows results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regressions of monthly flows
from April 2017 through December 2018 on Low Carbon Designation (LCD), the interaction
of this variable with a dummy Post equal to 1 for months following April 2018 (publication
period). The sample includes all active mutual funds domiciled in Europe or USA, excluding
729 funds that experienced an LCD upgrade or downgrade in August or November 2018.
Models (1), (3) and (5) use monthly net flows as the dependent variable, while models
(2), (4), and (6) use monthly normalized flows. All regressions control for month-by-style
and country fixed effects. The direct effect of the dummy Post is absorbed by the time
fixed effects. Singleton observations are dropped. t-statistics, based on robust standard
errors clustered at month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that
the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Flows Normalized Flows Normalized Flows Normalized
flows flows flows
LCD × Post 0.23*** 1.95*** 0.28*** 2.31*** 0.18** 1.50**
(3.66) (3.09) (3.95) (3.25) (2.33) (2.78)
LCD 0.14*** 1.18*** 0.07* 0.78** 0.25*** 1.87***
(4.67) (4.36) (1.97) (2.60) (6.10) (6.52)
Return 0.15*** 1.04** 0.15*** 1.02*** 0.21*** 1.59***
(3.77) (2.54) (4.79) (3.01) (8.18) (6.68)
Log assets -0.01 0.87** 0.00 1.03*** -0.02** 0.81**
(-1.72) (2.60) (0.67) (2.99) (-2.51) (2.35)
Volatility 0.02 0.30 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.39
(0.40) (0.77) (-0.01) (-0.20) (-0.31) (1.07)
Age -0.05*** -0.43*** -0.05*** -0.39*** -0.05*** -0.48***
(-19.04) (-28.10) (-15.30) (-22.97) (-22.88) (-24.75)
∆1 Globe -0.07 -0.21 -0.03 0.10 -0.08 -0.10
(-1.14) (-0.64) (-0.39) (0.27) (-0.99) (-0.18)
∆5 Globes 0.10 0.44 0.08 0.36 0.07 -0.21
(1.33) (0.72) (1.28) (0.69) (0.90) (-0.40)
∆Stars 0.08*** 0.39 0.10** 0.48* 0.05* 0.20
(2.87) (1.70) (2.44) (1.83) (2.06) (0.83)
Observations 396,398 396,398 255,579 255,579 140,767 140,767
R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.21
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Why do investors react? Part 1: Anticipation of future performance
This table shows results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regressions of monthly flows
from April 2017 through December 2018. Future quarterly return is the fund’s forward
return in the next three months. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered along
month, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Flows Normalized Flows Normalized Flows Normalized
flows flows flows
LCD × Post 0.22*** 1.92*** 0.27*** 2.27*** 0.17** 1.48**
(3.55) (3.03) (3.83) (3.15) (2.25) (2.77)
LCD 0.13*** 1.14*** 0.07* 0.74** 0.25*** 1.77***
(5.10) (4.54) (1.90) (2.55) (5.57) (6.06)
Future quarterly return 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.16*
(1.09) (0.71) (1.67) (1.09) (1.26) (1.86)
Observations 393,577 393,577 253,656 253,656 139,867 139,867
R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.21
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
41
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353239
Table 6: Why do investors react? Part 2: Investor preferences
This table shows results of OLS regressions of monthly flows from April 2017 through De-
cember 2018 exploring the differential effect of the LCD in different sub-samples: for retail
vs. institutional funds (Panel A); for poor vs. good past financial performers (Panel B); and
for low vs. high sustainability rated funds (Panel C). Poor (good) past financial performers
are funds with an adjusted return (based on their Morningstar category) in the last three
months in the bottom (top) quartile. Low (high) sustainability-rated funds are funds with 1
or 2 (4 or 5) Morningstar sustainability globes. All regressions control for month-by-style and
country fixed effects. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered along month, are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Retail vs. institutional funds
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Flows Flows Flows Flows Flows Flows
Retail Institutional Retail Institutional Retail Institutional
LCD × Post 0.25*** 0.18** 0.29*** 0.24 0.20** 0.14
(3.12) (2.35) (3.22) (1.60) (2.25) (1.32)
LCD 0.08** 0.32*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.33***
(2.64) (6.84) (0.61) (3.86) (4.21) (5.33)
Observations 299,981 96,361 221,197 34,267 78,725 61,998
R-squared 0.17 0.10 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.08
Panel B: Poor vs. good past performing funds
Poor Good Poor Good Poor Good
LCD × Post 0.33*** 0.16 0.55*** 0.12 0.06 0.25
(3.77) (0.91) (4.08) (0.71) (0.27) (1.26)
LCD 0.16** 0.11 -0.13 0.12* 0.56*** -0.01
(2.60) (1.67) (-1.28) (1.81) (5.42) (-0.11)
Observations 81,112 80,738 52,037 51,934 29,036 28,910
R-squared 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.10 0.10
Panel C: Low vs. high sustainability rated funds
Low sust. High sust. Low sust. High sust. Low sust. High sust.
LCD × Post 0.41*** 0.06 0.43*** 0.10 0.29 0.09
(2.98) (0.78) (2.90) (1.26) (1.66) (0.81)
LCD 0.17** 0.27*** 0.09 0.25*** 0.34*** 0.22**
(2.60) (5.06) (1.17) (4.50) (3.29) (2.60)
Observations 84,121 88,126 59,291 62,635 24,801 25,454
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.11 0.09
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Funds tilt portfolios towards low-carbon firms
This table shows results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regressions of quarterly gross
and Abnormal Carbon Risk (CR and Abn CR) from March 2017 through September 2019
on the interaction between the dummy NotLCD (funds that did not receive the LCD at the
initial release) and the dummy Post (period after April 2018). Panel B shows the regressions
for quarterly gross and Abnormal Fossil Fuel Involvement (FFI and Abn FFI). Abnormal
climate performance metrics (indicated by Abn) are constructed to account for price changes
by subtracting for each category-month pair the mean CR and FFI of explicit indexers and
passive investors (Active Share ≤60%). We compute the means separately by the degree
to which the treatment criteria are fulfilled, i.e., ∅CR≤10, ∅FFI≤7, both, and none. The
sample includes all active mutual funds domiciled in Europe or USA. All regressions control
for quarter-by-style fixed effects and lagged fund-level controls. The direct effect of the
dummy Post is absorbed by the time fixed effects. Singleton observations are dropped. t-
statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered along fund, are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Carbon Risk
Full sample Europe US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: CR Abn CR CR Abn CR CR Abn CR
NotLCD × Post -0.48*** -0.31*** -0.46*** -0.29*** -0.50*** -0.31***
(-13.83) (-8.49) (-11.32) (-7.01) (-7.44) (-4.26)
Observations 86,063 86,063 57,846 57,846 28,206 28,206
R-squared 0.71 0.19 0.69 0.24 0.79 0.23
Panel B: Fossil Fuel Involvement
Full sample Europe US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: FFI Abn FFI FFI Abn FFI FFI Abn FFI
NotLCD × Post -0.29*** -0.90*** -0.26*** -0.98*** -0.33** -0.60***
(-4.15) (-12.46) (-3.16) (-11.61) (-2.47) (-4.41)
Observations 86,063 86,063 57,846 57,846 28,206 28,206
R-squared 0.66 0.37 0.59 0.39 0.78 0.39
Constant & controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE fund Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Mutual funds’ responses - Changes in portfolio composition
This table shows results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regressions of the % of assets
under management that mutual funds in negligible, low, medium, high, and severe Carbon
Risk (CR) firms from March 2017 through September 2019 on the interaction between the
dummy NotLCD (funds that did not receive the LCD at the initial release) and the dummy
Post (period after April 2018). These categories correspond to a CR score of 0, 0.01 - 9.99, 10 -
29.99, 30 - 49.99, and>50 respectively. The sample includes all active mutual funds domiciled
in Europe or USA. All regressions control for quarter-by-style fixed effects and lagged fund-
level controls. The direct effect of the dummy Post is absorbed by the time fixed effects.
Singleton observations are dropped. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered
along fund, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. variable: % Negligible CR % Low CR % Medium CR % High CR % Severe CR
NotLCD × Post 0.81*** 0.94*** -0.98*** -0.34*** -0.21***
(5.10) (6.28) (-3.70) (-5.89) (-4.21)
Observations 77,760 79,640 30,269 59,606 32,653
R-squared 0.62 0.37 0.54 0.61 0.57
Constant & controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE fund Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 9: Which mutual funds react most strongly?
This table presents results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regressions of quarterly
Abnormal Carbon Risk (Abn CR) and Abnormal Fossil Fuel Involvement (Abn FFI) from
March 2017 through September 2019 on the interaction between the dummy NotLCD (funds
that did not receive the LCD at the initial release) and the dummy Post (period after April
2018). Panel A compares funds in the bottom and top quartile of the performance distri-
bution (category-adjusted returns in the quarter prior to the LCD introduction). Panel B
compares funds whose flows in the quarter prior to the introduction of the LCD were in the
bottom or top quartile. Panel C compares young and old funds (age ≤25-th vs. age ≥75-th
percentile). Panel D compares funds that had either no or small (≤25-th percentile) 12b-1
marketing and distribution fees with funds that had larger (>25-th percentile) 12b-1 fees.
Abnormal climate performance metrics (indicated by Abn) are constructed to account for
price changes by subtracting for each category-month pair the mean CR and FFI of explicit
indexers and passive investors (Active Share ≤60%). We compute the means separately by
the degree to which the treatment criteria are fulfilled, i.e., ∅CR≤10 only, ∅FFI≤7 only,
both, and none. The sample includes all active mutual funds domiciled in Europe or USA.
All regressions control for quarter-by-style fixed effects and lagged fund-level controls. The
direct effect of the dummy Post is absorbed by the time fixed effects. Singleton observations
are dropped. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered along fund, are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different
from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Flows in previous quarter
Bottom quartile Top quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable: Abn CR Abn FFI Abn CR Abn FFI
NotLCD × Post -0.10 -0.41** -0.27*** -1.00***
(-1.03) (-1.99) (-2.65) (-4.16)
NotLCD 0.40** 0.76*** 0.53*** 0.54**
(2.31) (3.46) (3.21) (2.07)
Observations 9,857 9,857 9,887 9,887
R-squared 0.37 0.47 0.19 0.35
Panel B: Fund age
Young Old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. variable: Abn CR Abn FFI Abn CR Abn FFI
NotLCD × Post -0.41*** -1.34*** -0.20*** -0.51***
(-4.96) (-8.41) (-3.07) (-3.68)
NotLCD 0.56*** 0.76*** 0.35*** 0.04
(4.63) (4.37) (3.20) (0.27)
Observations 21,482 21,482 20,548 20,548
R-squared 0.16 0.35 0.32 0.48
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Table 10: Effects of LCD downgrades and upgrades through September 2019
Panel A of this table summarizes the results of the quarterly LCD updates that took place
between May 2018 and September 2019 at a quarterly frequency, based on the portfolio
holdings as at the end of each quarter. Panel B shows results of OLS regressions of monthly
flows from May 2018 through September 2019 on LCD Downgrade and LCD Upgrade, and
control variables (monthly return, volatility, log asset, age, ∆1 Globe, ∆5 Globes, ∆Stars).
LCD Downgrade and LCD Upgrade are dummy variables equal to 1 for months following an
LCD downgrade or upgrade, and 0 otherwise. All regressions control for month-by-style and
country fixed effects. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered along month, are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: LCD changes after April 2018
Aug 2018 Nov 2018 Feb 2019 May 2019 Aug 2019
LCD updates (Q2-2018) (Q3-2018) (Q4-2018) (Q1-2019) (Q2-2019)
Downgrades 226 (1.14%) 192 (1.08%) 166 (0.84%) 274 (1.36%) 158 (0.78%)
Confirmations 19,462 (98.02%) 17,303 (97.59%) 19,218 (97.69%) 19,656 (97.28%) 19,872 (97.57%)
Upgrades 168 (0.85%) 235 (1.33%) 288 (1.46%) 276 (1.37%) 337 (1.65%)
Panel B: Effect of LCD changes after April 2018
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Flows Normalized Flows Normalized Flows Normalized
flows flows flows
LCD Downgrade -0.15*** -0.58* -0.18*** -0.74** 0.02 0.31
(-4.78) (-2.11) (-5.00) (-2.60) (0.31) (0.66)
LCD Upgrade 0.25*** 1.74*** 0.24*** 1.61*** 0.23** 1.94***
(5.45) (6.23) (4.44) (4.36) (2.50) (3.99)
Observations 338,609 338,609 222,657 222,657 115,926 115,926
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.17
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 11: LCD and idiosyncratic volatility
This table shows regressions of funds’ idiosyncratic volatility on LCD, Morningstar Globes
rating, and control variables. Idiosyncratic volatility is computed as the standard deviation
of residuals from a Fama-French three-factor model run over the 17-month post-publication
period from May 2018 through September 2019, for funds with at least 9 observations of
monthly returns. Active is an indicator for mutual funds with Active Share ≥ 60%. Log
assets is the average size of the fund across the post-publication period. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly
different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Idiosyncratic volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LCD 0.23*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07***











Age 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(3.86) (-0.55) (-0.39) (-0.05)
Log assets -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(-13.74) (-8.90) (-8.48) (-7.57)
Manager tenure 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00
(3.82) (2.27) (2.16) (1.12)
Constant 2.80*** 2.18*** 2.08*** 2.17***
(31.56) (37.57) (33.75) (32.17)
Observations 16,004 15,999 15,999 13,508
R-squared 0.15 0.66 0.66 0.66
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Category FE No Yes Yes Yes
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Supplementary Appendix
Figure A1: Investors prefer low-carbon funds - Robustness check: Shorter pre-
publication period with pre-publication labels
These figures show the equally-weighted average monthly flows from December 2017 through
December 2018 of European (top) and US (bottom) funds that had portfolios with low-
carbon features (solid green lines) and of those that did not (dashed red line). These graphs
leverage on the availability of LCD data from December 2017 to April 2018 (pre-publication
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Table A1: : Firm-level Carbon Risk scores by GICS sectors
This table shows the descriptive statistics of 2017 firm-level Carbon Risk scores from the
ESG research provider Sustainalytics, by GICS sector. Panel A looks at firms head-quartered
in Europe, while Panel B looks at firms head-quartered in the USA. According to Sustain-
alytics, the Carbon Risk score capture the remaining unmanaged carbon risk after taking
into account a firm’s carbon risk management activities (for details, see Morningstar, 2018b).
Morningstar uses the firm-level Carbon Risk scores from Sustainalytics to compute the value-
weighted fund-level Carbon Risk scores.
Panel A: Europe
N min p25 mean p50 p75 max sd
Energy 34 8.89 16.90 28.31 26.46 35.97 62.89 14.14
Materials 74 1.59 11.63 18.33 17.33 24.54 48.40 8.02
Industrials 170 0.00 6.51 13.92 13.70 21.90 36.05 9.26
Consumer discretionary 108 0.00 0.00 8.51 7.23 12.13 41.25 7.93
Consumer staples 51 0.00 3.89 8.42 6.97 12.01 20.69 5.62
Health Care 65 0.00 0.00 2.72 0.00 5.93 14.72 4.49
Financials 144 0.00 7.95 11.70 11.86 15.27 25.20 5.27
IT 62 0.00 0.00 3.21 0.00 5.92 23.91 5.14
Communication 62 0.00 0.00 5.39 3.49 9.40 19.36 6.22
Utilities 41 0.00 8.50 15.80 14.00 23.54 38.70 9.64
Real Estate 67 4.28 8.44 12.68 12.54 17.13 20.70 4.92
Total 878 0.00 4.61 11.30 10.32 15.96 62.89 9.34
Panel B: USA
N min p25 mean p50 p75 max sd
Energy 106 0.00 12.27 33.61 24.07 58.15 75.28 24.24
Materials 104 0.00 9.93 16.40 15.35 21.64 63.51 11.59
Industrials 149 0.00 8.27 14.84 14.21 21.16 46.22 9.56
Consumer discretionary 131 0.00 0.00 11.58 10.10 17.63 67.65 11.22
Consumer staples 60 0.00 4.74 12.03 10.64 17.50 58.06 10.08
Health care 95 0.00 0.00 8.97 7.28 14.37 81.09 11.08
Financials 161 0.00 7.24 13.03 12.98 16.25 76.20 10.19
IT 125 0.00 0.00 9.95 7.81 14.41 67.32 12.06
Communication 58 0.00 0.00 8.95 7.62 14.78 35.07 8.69
Utilities 52 0.00 9.67 16.27 16.48 23.14 37.79 10.26
Real Estate 104 0.00 8.73 13.92 13.80 18.72 54.08 8.76
Total 1,145 0.00 5.78 14.61 12.55 19.50 81.09 13.98
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Table A2: Correlations between variables
This table shows the correlations between variables for the period from April 2017 through
September 2019. * indicates that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero
at the 1% level.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. LCD
2. Flows 0.01*
3. Normalized flows 0.02* 0.75*
4. Return 0.04* 0.06* -0.03*
5. Log assets 0.08* -0.01* -0.01* 0.03*
6. Volatility 0.19* -0.05* -0.02* 0.04* -0.00
7. Age 0.07* -0.11* -0.14* 0.01* 0.29* 0.05*
8. Globes 0.09* -0.00 0.00 0.01* -0.02* -0.08* 0.03*
9. Stars 0.06* 0.14* 0.17* 0.04* 0.31* -0.06* 0.00 -0.02*
10. Socially conscious 0.11* 0.03* 0.04* 0.01* 0.05* 0.03* -0.03* 0.17* 0.04*
11. Institutional -0.03* 0.03* 0.06* 0.00 0.15* -0.02* -0.12* -0.04* 0.12* 0.05*
Table A3: Investors prefer low-carbon funds - Robustness check: Adding fund
fixed effects
This table shows results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regressions of monthly flows
from April 2017 through December 2018 on Low Carbon Designation (LCD), the interaction
of this variable with a dummy Post equal to 1 for months following April 2018 (publication
period), and control variables. Models (1), (3) and (5) use monthly net flows as the dependent
variable, while models (2), (4), and (6) use monthly normalized flows. All regressions control
for month-by-style and fund fixed effects. Singleton observations are dropped. t-statistics,
based on robust standard errors clustered along month, are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Flows Normalized Flows Normalized Flows Normalized
flows flows flows
LCD × Post 0.40*** 2.65*** 0.45*** 2.97*** 0.35*** 2.20***
(6.42) (4.26) (6.20) (4.12) (4.67) (4.33)
Observations 396,398 396,398 255,579 255,579 140,767 140,767
R-squared 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.50
Constant & controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A4: Investors prefer low-carbon funds - Robustness check: Fully interacted
model
This table shows results of difference-in-differences regressions of monthly flows from April
2017 through December 2018 on Low Carbon Designation (LCD), control variables (monthly
return, volatility, log asset, age, ∆1 Globe, ∆5 Globes, ∆Stars), and the interaction of all
variables with a dummy Post equal to 1 for months after April 2018. t-statistics, based on
robust standard errors clustered at month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Flows Normalized Flows Normalized Flows Normalized
flows flows flows
LCD × Post 0.23*** 2.17*** 0.28*** 2.58*** 0.16* 1.62**
(3.45) (3.34) (4.21) (3.56) (1.85) (2.50)
LCD 0.14*** 1.11*** 0.07* 0.69** 0.26*** 1.86***
(4.13) (3.68) (1.85) (2.17) (6.17) (6.58)
Return × Post -0.09 -0.53 -0.07 -0.12 0.01 0.04
(-1.43) (-0.72) (-1.22) (-0.19) (0.10) (0.09)
Log assets × Post 0.03 -0.71* -0.03 -1.10* 0.02 -1.09
(1.13) (-1.89) (-1.61) (-1.87) (0.90) (-1.72)
Volatility × Post 0.09 0.79 0.15* 1.25* 0.03 0.39
(0.99) (0.96) (1.94) (1.79) (0.27) (0.51)
Age × Post 0.06** 0.02*** 0.03 0.01** 0.06
(5.57) (2.09) (4.98) (0.69) (2.81) (1.41)
∆1 Globe × Post -0.03 -0.63 0.10 0.11 -0.15 -0.45
(-0.26) (-1.05) (0.70) (0.16) (-0.95) (-0.38)
∆5 Globes × Post 0.16 1.48 0.08 1.23 0.13 0.09
(1.24) (1.52) (0.74) (1.41) (0.86) (0.08)
∆Stars × Post 0.03 0.27 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.33
(0.49) (0.55) (0.52) (0.46) (0.57) (0.81)
Observations 396,398 396,398 255,579 255,579 140,767 140,767
R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.07 0.21
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE month Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A5: Investors prefer low-carbon funds - Robustness check: Controlling for
CR and FFI
This table shows results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regressions of monthly flows
from April 2017 through December 2018 on Low Carbon Designation (LCD), Portfolio Car-
bon Risk (CR) and Fossil fuel involvement (FFI), their interaction with Post, and control
variables (monthly return, volatility, log asset, age, ∆1 Globe, ∆5 Globes, ∆Stars). All
regressions control for month-by-style and country fixed effects. t-statistics, based on robust
standard errors clustered at month level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Flows Normalized Flows Normalized Flows Normalized
flows flows flows
LCD × Post 0.28*** 2.27*** 0.31*** 2.32*** 0.13 1.54***
(4.17) (3.99) (4.07) (3.32) (1.26) (3.08)
LCD -0.03 -0.41 -0.04 -0.16 0.02 -0.82**
(-0.65) (-1.19) (-0.79) (-0.40) (0.45) (-2.19)
CR -0.02* -0.19** 0.01 -0.01 -0.05*** -0.44***
(-1.93) (-2.68) (0.70) (-0.08) (-6.57) (-6.84)
CR × Post -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.29*
(-0.34) (-0.37) (-0.79) (-0.89) (-1.44) (-1.89)
FFI -0.03*** -0.22*** -0.04*** -0.25*** -0.01*** -0.16***
(-6.68) (-8.18) (-7.04) (-7.69) (-3.14) (-5.66)
FFI × Post 0.02*** 0.14*** 0.02*** 0.13** 0.03*** 0.23***
(3.28) (3.11) (3.10) (2.60) (3.03) (4.44)
Observations 220,101 220,101 154,773 154,773 65,236 65,236
R-squared 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.26
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A6: Financial and climate performance
This table shows results of OLS regressions of monthly returns from May through September
2019 on the Low Carbon Designation (LCD) and control variables (log assets, volatility, and
age). The dependent variable is CAPM-adjusted returns in models 1, 3 and 5, and Fama-
French-adjusted returns in models 2, 4, and 6. Both sets of returns are based on betas
estimated with monthly returns from January 2016 through December 2017. All regressions
control for month-by-style and country fixed effects. t-statistics, based on robust standard
errors double-clustered along month and fund, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate that the parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Full sample Europe USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: CAPM-adj. FF-adj. CAPM-adj. FF-adj. CAPM-adj. FF-adj.
returns returns returns returns returns returns
LCD 0.36** 0.21** 0.36** 0.22** 0.40** 0.20*
(2.46) (2.81) (2.40) (2.86) (2.33) (2.03)
Log assets 0.01*** 0.01** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00 -0.01
(2.93) (2.19) (3.48) (3.11) (0.11) (-0.73)
Volatility -0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.06 -0.10 -0.09
(-0.20) (0.53) (-0.06) (0.73) (-1.47) (-1.46)
Age -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.37) (1.54) (-1.71) (1.57) (0.16) (0.24)
Observations 287,988 287,988 183,024 183,024 104,919 104,919
Adjusted R-squared 0.47 0.44 0.63 0.60 0.48 0.47
Month-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Two-way clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table A7: Funds tilt portfolios towards low-carbon firms - Robustness checks
This table shows additional robustness tests for the analyses of mutual funds’ responses to
the introduction of the LCD. These are results of OLS difference-in-differences (DID) regres-
sions of quarterly Abnormal Carbon Risk (Abn CR) and Abnormal Fossil Fuel Involvement
(Abn FFI) from March 2017 through September 2019 on the interaction between the dummy
NotLCD (funds that did not receive the LCD at the initial release) and the dummy Post (pe-
riod after April 2018). Abnormal climate performance metrics are constructed to account for
price changes by subtracting for each category-month pair the mean CR and FFI of explicit
indexers and passive investors (Active Share ≤60%). We compute the means separately by
the degree to which the treatment criteria are fulfilled, i.e., ∅CR≤10 only, ∅FFI≤7 only,
both, and none. Panel A adds fund FEs to the main specification. Panel B runs a fully
interacted model. The sample in Panels A and B includes all active mutual funds domiciled
in Europe or USA. All regressions control for quarter-by-style fixed effects and lagged fund-
level controls. The direct effect of the dummy Post is absorbed by the time fixed effects.
Singleton observations are dropped. t-statistics, based on robust standard errors clustered
along fund, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that the parameter estimate
is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Fund fixed effects
Full sample Europe US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Abn CR Abn FFI Abn CR Abn FFI Abn CR Abn FFI
NotLCD × Post -0.14*** -0.60*** -0.17*** -0.72*** -0.08 -0.32***
(-4.87) (-9.14) (-4.84) (-9.17) (-1.61) (-2.60)
Observations 85,969 85,969 57,769 57,769 28,189 28,189
R-squared 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.87
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
[Continued on the next page]
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Panel B: Fully interacted model
Full sample Europe US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Abn CR Abn FFI Abn CR Abn FFI Abn CR Abn FFI
NotLCD × Post -0.38*** -0.94*** -0.36*** -1.00*** -0.42*** -0.72***
(-10.32) (-12.60) (-8.51) (-11.56) (-5.47) (-5.00)
NotLCD 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.30*** 0.09 0.90*** 1.29***
(8.91) (5.78) (4.95) (0.93) (7.48) (9.18)
Quarterly return × Post -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.20*** -0.21***
(-17.36) (-7.82) (-15.07) (-6.07) (-10.09) (-5.27)
Log assets × Post -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.06
(-1.59) (-0.83) (-1.19) (0.21) (-1.10) (-1.56)
Volatility × Post 0.19*** -0.09 0.18*** -0.11 0.07 -0.17
(3.60) (-0.81) (3.25) (-0.96) (0.60) (-0.88)
Age × Post 0.01*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.03*** 0.01** 0.03**
(3.14) (4.55) (1.67) (3.96) (2.55) (2.51)
Observations 86,063 86,063 57,846 57,846 28,206 28,206
R-squared 0.19 0.37 0.24 0.39 0.23 0.39
Constant & controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter-Style FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE fund Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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